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Abstract
The Society of Jesus has promulgated the Universal Apostolic Preferences (UAPs) for the decade 2019-29.
We know what the UAPs are: to seek God, walk with the poor, accompany youth, and collaborate in the care
of the earth. And we know what they are for: the ongoing conversion of persons and institutions in their
commitment to the mission of reconciliation of justice. But what, exactly, is a “preference” anyhow? In this
reflection, I draw on the moral tradition of virtue ethics to argue that the preferences are best understood as
“practices” or, in other words, as the fundamental actions by which crucial virtues like mercy and justice are
developed in persons and in institutions. I also argue that seeing the preferences as practices in the context of
virtue ethics opens up fruitful possibilities for fostering engagement with the UAPs at Jesuit institutions of
higher education.
Introduction
So, what is a “preference” anyhow?
The Society of Jesus has promulgated the
Universal Apostolic Preferences (UAPs) for the
decade 2019-29. We know what the UAPs are: To
show the way to God through the Spiritual
Exercises and discernment; to walk with the poor,
the outcasts of the world, and those whose dignity
has been violated, in a mission of reconciliation
and justice; to accompany young people in the
creation of a hope-filled future, and to collaborate
in the care of our Common Home.1
We know what the UAPs are for. In his Letter of
Promulgation, Jesuit Superior General Arturo
Sosa said the UAPs are a means for “incarnating
the mission of reconciliation and justice in all the
apostolic services to which we, along with others,
have been sent.”2 Further, he emphasized that the
UAPs are best understood as “orientations that go
beyond ‘doing something’ and enable us to
achieve our transformation as persons, as religious
communities, and as apostolic works and
institutions in which we collaborate with others.”3
Still we should ask: what specifically is a
“preference”? In the context of the United States,
this question arises in part because of culture. As a

matter of usage, the word “preference” in English
is deployed in casual conversation to indicate
something that would be better to choose than
something else, but that is, nonetheless, not a
requirement. This common usage suggests an
attenuated sense of the UAPs: That they are good,
but not necessary options in the life of Jesuit
institutions of higher education. Yet, that way of
putting things is not consistent with the obvious
central importance given to them in Father Sosa’s
Letter of Promulgation.
In the U.S. context, another problem of
interpretation arises from the widespread
academic and popular use of rational choice
theory and its accompanying language of
“preferences.” In the logic of that theory, each
person is rendered as an economic actor who
orders preferences in terms of rational egoism.
Furthermore, this egoistic ordering applies
whether one’s preferences are for profit-making or
for altruism. In any case, the logic of preferences
in rational choice theory is a far cry from the logic
of preferences in Father Sosa’s Letter of
Promulgation: In the former, preferences
relentlessly direct us toward ourselves; in the
latter, the UAPs direct us toward others for the
sake of these others.4
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After having given many presentations on the
UAPs to students, staff, and faculty at Santa Clara
University during the 2020-2021 academic year, I
think it is essential to address such possible
cultural misconceptions. Doing so clears the space
for the reception of the UAPs. However, I think
two more steps of identification are crucial. One is
to note that the use of the word “preference” in
the UAPs is immediately derived from the classic
Jesuit process of discernment and its
corresponding choice of the best means for
responding to a challenge to the Gospel in a
particular time and place. In that sense, in the face
of the challenges facing the Society of Jesus from
2019 to 2029, these four preferences were chosen
as the best means of response (i.e., they were the
best “choices” or “preferences”) among many
other options. Such a selection was undertaken in
a fashion consistent with the emphasis on
reconciliation and justice at the Jesuits’ 36th
General Congregation in 2016.5
UAPs as Practices in the Context of an Ethics
of Virtue
A second step of identification is also important:
Understanding the UAPs as practices in the
context of what is called a virtue ethics or an
ethics of virtue. To identify the UAPs in this way
is not simply to make an ethical point. Instead,
doing so can reveal possibilities for engagement
with the UAPs at Jesuit institutions of higher
education.
Ethics across time and cultures have classically
affirmed three distinct kinds of moral reasoning:
one based on principles and moral laws, another
on consequences, and a third on virtues and vices.
In the last few decades, there has been a huge
resurgence of interest in virtue ethics.6 The word
“virtue” may sound prudish to many, however
that resonance is a residue of a Victorian and
modern appropriation of an ancient moral
tradition. Indeed, the emphasis on virtues and
vices as a way to think about the meaning of living
a good life goes back to such figures as Aristotle
in the fourth century BCE and St. Thomas
Aquinas in the 13th century.
An ethics of virtue asks us to consider what it
means in our time and place to be a person of
good character, and thus asks us what virtues or

abiding traits of character ought to constitute such
a person; what practices or habits inculcate such
virtues; what kinds of communities promote the
practices that develop virtues; and what stories or
symbols provide the examples or inspiration that
point us toward the good life. The return to virtue
ethics has been driven in part by a sense that an
ethics of principles or consequences alone tends
to leave out the most important aspect of any
ethics: actual human beings in all their embodied,
affective, and communal capacities.
In his book Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics, the
late moral theologian William Spohn argued that
virtue ethics combined with spirituality is the best
way to appropriate the moral vision of the New
Testament (which, in any case, is the ultimate basis
for the moral vision of Jesuit higher education).7
To be sure, the New Testament includes ethics of
principles and of consequences. Nevertheless,
Jesus did not come teaching timeless and abstract
truths, but instead proclaimed a dramatic new
divine initiative that sought the heart and
demanded love in action.8 An ethics of virtue,
Spohn argues, allows for both dimensions: The
interior change of affection and the exterior
manifestation of action. Moreover, combining an
ethics of virtue with spirituality allows for the preeminent role of grace in the moral life. In
Christian terms, living out an ethics of virtue is
not a process of self-mastery but instead a pilgrim
journey of imperfection, always waiting on the
transformative possibilities of what Spohn calls
the “patient grace of God.”9
The wording of the UAPs refers explicitly or
implicitly to many virtues, including reverence,
humility, prudence, justice, mercy,
accompaniment, hope, creativity, care for the
earth, and collaboration. When we say that
someone has such virtues, we are referring to
more than a one-off action of, for instance, justice
or mercy. Instead, we are referring to an abiding
interior disposition of a person to be just or
merciful—a disposition that in turn is consistently
reflected in the exterior actions—the just and
merciful practices—of that person. Virtue ethics
assumes that we are free and responsible and
constitute ourselves by the practices we pursue (in
a Christian sense, such constituting occurs in
interaction with divine grace).10 Who we are and
what we do are inseparably connected. This
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language of the union of interiority and exteriority
is frequently present in Father Sosa’s writing on
the UAPs.
In Go and Do Likewise, Spohn correlates Gospel
virtues like forgiveness, compassion, and justice
with an array of practices that loom large in the
stories of Jesus: his table fellowship with sinners;
his healing the sick; his feeding the hungry. Other
examples abound. Disciples of Jesus, Spohn
argues, have a template before them. They can see
the virtues that distinguish a follower of Jesus and
they can see the practices—and imagine analogous
practices—by which to foster such virtues.
Moreover, they can turn to the stories of the
Gospels to point the way: The meaning of the
virtue of love is not conveyed by a theory but in
the account of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:2537).11 In turn, the virtues, practices, and stories are
sustained by a community of disciples. We can
draw important inferences from this for thinking
about the UAPs in terms of the virtues, practices,
stories, and communities that constitute Jesuit
higher education.
It is important to note one other key factor about
practices that is relevant to the UAPs. For
practices to foster the development of virtues,
Spohn argues, they must be done with a right
intention.12 Here, he especially has in mind how
practices can slide easily into becoming
instrumental techniques aimed at self-interested
perfectionism.13 By contrast, he says, practices will
not be transformative if they are aimed at personal
transformation. Instead, practices become
transformative when they are done for the sake of
the practice itself and for the disinterested sake of
another. Thus, for instance, the third UAP—to
accompany youth in the creation of a hope-filled
future—isn’t simply about producing hopeful
youth at institutions of Jesuit higher education.
Instead, it’s about approaching the practice of
accompaniment as something worthy and
enjoyable in itself. Moreover, it’s also about the
disinterested intention of accompaniment: How
can we be present to the youth at Jesuit
institutions of higher education in ways that foster
their creativity, which is surely the key to a future
of hope? The goal of graduating more hope-filled
students cannot be separated from the intentions
by which we go about practices.

UAPs as Practices in an Ethics of Virtue:
Practical Implications
I have noted that it is clarifying to understand the
UAPs as practices within the framework of an
ethics of virtue oriented toward the Ignatian
mission of justice and mercy. What are practical
implications of such a claim? How might Jesuit
institutions of higher education promote
engagement with the UAPs among students, staff,
and faculty?
UAPs Are Not One-Offs and Neither are Virtues
It is no doubt tempting to organize a talk on the
UAPs or to fund a study on them or to check a
box and do something in a one-off way related to
each of the preferences. We must resist this
temptation. If we think of the UAPs as practices
in the context of an ethics of virtue, we can see
that we have to think more long-term. We are not
going to develop the virtues of mercy and justice
overnight. Virtues take time and repeated practice
and we need to settle in for the long haul of
intentional, ongoing transformation.
First Practices, Then Priorities
Father Sosa has said that the UAPs are not to be
understood as strategic priorities. Still, it cannot
be the case that Jesuit institutions of higher
education would not establish strategic priorities.
Instead, I think the UAPs are meant to ensure that
strategic priorities arise from an authentic practice
of mission. Jesuit moral theologian James Keenan
has said we come to understand more deeply the
demands of the virtue of justice through our
practice of justice.14 So it goes for identifying the
strategic priorities of our shared mission of
reconciliation and justice: We will strategically
align our priorities with this mission if we actually
practice mercy and justice.
Virtues, Practices, and Many Traditions
Virtues and practices emerge from moral and
religious traditions. Of course, the UAPs are
practices aimed at fostering virtues that emerge
out of the Jesuit and Catholic moral and religious
traditions. There are many points of comparison
between the understanding of virtues like mercy
and justice in the Catholic tradition and the
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understanding of these virtues in such traditions
as Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and
other faiths. Jesuit institutions of higher
education welcome students, staff, and faculty of
many different backgrounds. It could be fruitful to
engage in conversations about the UAPs with
students, staff, and faculty from many different
traditions. What in the virtues in their traditions
remind us of the virtues pointed to in the UAPs?
What practices in their traditions are reminiscent
of our invitations to seek God and practice
discernment; or to walk with the dispossessed?
Virtues, Practices, and Stories
As Spohn notes, we learn about virtues primarily
from stories. By thinking of the UAPs as practices
in the context of an ethics of virtue, we are also
invited to consider a wide range of stories that
contain such practices and reveal related virtues.
What stories from our students’ lives reveal
practices like accompanying the poor? What
stories from our colleagues’ lives include the
practices of seeking God and discernment?
Identifying such stories across many traditions
could be an excellent way to foster formation in
the spirit of the UAPs.
Conclusion
In this reflection, I have argued that the UAPs can
be accurately and helpfully understood as practices
within the context of an ethics of virtue. By seeing
the UAPs in such a light, we can understand better
what they are asking of all those in Jesuit higher
education. Furthermore, we can come to think
more creatively about how to foster engagement
with the UAPs in the many different contexts
faced by our campuses and communities.
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